

DEV'S 65-5524  
FILE Training

28 July 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Registrar, Office of Training  
**SUBJECT :** Defense Intelligence School/Advanced Intelligence Course  
**REFERENCE :** Your Memo dtd 28 June 65, subj: Selection of Candidates for Subject School

1. All Offices of the Deputy Director for Support were invited to make nominations for the Advanced Intelligence Course starting 7 September 1965 and running approximately 14 weeks.

2. None of the Offices had any candidates at this time but may have in subsequent Courses.

3. The above is forwarded in accordance with your request for advice on or before 1 August 1965.

19  
[Redacted]  
Senior Training Officer  
Deputy Director for Support

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SA-DD/S:RBJH/ms (28 July 65)

**Distribution:**

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - DD/S Chrono
- 1 - DD/S Subject ✓
- 1 - Senior Training Officer, DD/S

DD / S R E G I S T R A R

FILE Training

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Communications  
Director of Finance  
Director of Logistics  
Director of Medical Services  
Director of Personnel  
Director of Security  
Director of Training  
Executive Officer to the DD/S

SUBJECT : Selection of Candidates for the Defense Intelligence  
School Advanced Intelligence Course

1. Attached is a memorandum from the Registrar of the Office of Training in reference to candidates for the Defense Intelligence School Advanced Intelligence Course.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency, as you will note, has been invited to send two students to the Course which starts 7 September 1965. Employees of the Office of Training and the Office of Central Reference have attended a preliminary running of the Course and they recommend it highly. You will note from their critiques that the Course is recommended for many types of Agency employees.

3. We have been asked to submit our candidates within the next two weeks. Therefore, please advise me of an officer you would recommend for nomination to this Course who would personally benefit by attendance and at the same time represent the Agency in a highly selective student body.

Senior Training Officer  
Deputy Director for Support

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Attachment

Cy of OTR Memo dtd 28 June 65

SA-DD/S:RBJH/ms (13 July 65)

Distribution:

- 1 - Each Addressee, w/Att  
(Note for Record: Last pg of att to OTR Memo not forwarded.)
- 1 - DD/S Chrono, w/o Att/
- 1 - DD/S Subject, w/Att ✓
- 1 - Senior Training Officer, DD/S, w/Att (DD/S 65-3009)

All Senior Training Officers

28 June 1965

Registrar/TR

**Selection of Candidates for the Defense Intelligence School  
Advanced Intelligence Course.**

1. The Central Intelligence Agency has been invited to send two students to the Defense Intelligence School's Advanced Intelligence Course beginning 7 September 1965. This is a new course of approximately 14 weeks offered this spring for the first time. CIA had two officers in this pilot running and their critiques of the course attest to the value of such a program for selected Agency officers.

2. The course mission is "To enhance the preparation of selected senior military officers and key Department of Defense civilian personnel for important command, staff, and policy-making positions in the national, unified staff, and military departmental intelligence structure."

3. We are beginning now to screen candidates for this program. Ultimate selection of CIA's nominees rests with the Training Selection Board. It is our hope that a sufficient number of nominations are made to the Training Selection Board so that the Board can exercise its selection process. For this reason we urge you to make whatever nominations you wish to make to the Training Selection Board on or before 1 August 1965. No nominations will be considered after that date.

4. Agency candidates should be in Grade GS-15 or better unless there is a very highly qualified Grade 13. The candidate should be a career officer with at least ten years of Agency experience and should be broadly knowledgeable of Agency organization and functions. I have attached, for your information,

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**SUBJECT: selection of Candidates for the Defense Intelligence  
School Advanced Intelligence Course.**

copies of the training reports of [redacted]  
[redacted] on the first running of the course. [redacted]  
is a Senior Instructor in the Intelligence School, Office of  
Training. [redacted] is Staff Assistant to the Chief, Graphics  
Register. In addition to a brief description of the course, each  
has, from his own broad experience and knowledge of the Agency,  
indicated those areas of the Agency which might profit best from  
participation in such a program. These reports should be help-  
ful to you in your own screening process.

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[redacted]

Registrar  
Office of Training

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DATA SHEET ON THE

ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE COURSE

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL

1. PURPOSE:

This Data Sheet is designed to provide information to guest lecturers, visitors and friends who are to participate in the Advanced Intelligence Course program.

2. BACKGROUND:

The Defense Intelligence School (DIS) was established on 1 January 1963 as a joint service educational institution attached to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

3. MISSION OF DIS:

The mission of the DIS, as set forth in the establishing Department of Defense Directive and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved DIS Charter, is to conduct courses of instruction related to Department of Defense intelligence functions and calls for the establishment of an advanced course of intelligence for training of senior military officers and key civilian personnel.

4. THE ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE COURSE (AIC):

The AIC is one of several courses of instruction conducted at DIS. An Advanced Intelligence Course (AIC) Pilot program, however, will be conducted prior to the first regularly programmed AIC which will be scheduled in September 1965.

5. MISSION OF THE ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE COURSE:

The Course mission as stated in the Charter is: "To enhance the preparation of selected senior military officers and key Department of Defense civilian personnel for important command, staff, and policy-making positions in the national, unified staff, and military departmental intelligence structure."

Based on our analysis of the above mission, the school has structured a course emphasizing the following aspects of the intelligence officer's duties.

a. To manage or direct intelligence staffs, offices and activities on the national, unified, and departmental levels.

b. To develop and coordinate intelligence plans, policies, and programs with departmental and independent agencies of the U.S. Government.

c. To participate on inter-agency and joint/allied intelligence committees and working groups.

6. AIC (PILOT) STUDENT PREREQUISITES:

A small but highly selective student body from Department of Defense and other governmental agencies will attend the Pilot Course. The military and civilian students will be in the senior grades of their career fields, and they will have had considerable experience involving responsible intelligence duties at departmental and higher staff levels.

7. INSTRUCTIONAL METHODOLOGY:

Instruction is to be offered on the graduate level. Although there are to be no formal examinations, each student's progress will be closely supervised by an assigned faculty advisor.

A variety of educational techniques are to be employed throughout the course. However, lectures by guest speakers are to be one of the principle means employed in classroom situations. All guest lecturers are asked to save approximately one third of their scheduled time for class questions and discussions. In addition to their presentation, guest speakers on selected subjects will be asked to remain and participate in a 50 minute Post Lecture Conference.

The Post Lecture Conferences (PLC) will be scheduled immediately following the speaker's presentation. These informal conferences will be attended by a small group of four to five students - ones who have a special and professional interest in the subject matter. The purpose of these conferences is to permit the student to develop further the subject material according to his need and future assignments.

As a matter of continuing policy the school assures all guest speakers that their remarks and opinions will not be publicized, quoted, or discussed outside the school.

8. FACILITIES:

Facilities available to the AIC students within the school include a library, language laboratory, seminar rooms and a classroom. The library is divided into a classified and unclassified section. In the unclassified section there are approximately 140 current magazines and 15,000 books to facilitate student research. The language laboratory has 24 listening booths with training tapes for 60 languages and dialects. Seminar rooms are used as study rooms and they range in seating capacity from five to ten students. The AIC Classroom is where lectures are normally given. This room seats 25 students. The speaker may either stand and use a lectern or he may be seated at a conference table to deliver his lecture.

Within the AIC Classroom the following equipment is available: A 16 mm movie projector equipped for optical sound track, a 35 mm slide projector "Bell & Howell," a Vu-graph projector for 10x10" or smaller transparencies, a blackboard, world maps, and a tape recorder. A public address is not required due to the size of the room and the audience.

9. ACTION OFFICE AND STAFF FOR AIC:

Listed below are the action officers and the office telephone numbers.  
These officers and staff are available to assist you in any manner that  
you may desire.

STAT



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# Memorandum

TO : Director of Training  
THRU : Chief, IS/TR  
Chief, IPF/IS/TR  
FROM :

DATE: 14 June 1965

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SUBJECT: Report of Attendance at Defense Intelligence School's  
Advanced Intelligence Course

1. The pilot running of the Advanced Intelligence Course, presented by the Defense Intelligence School, was given from 1 March through 4 June 1965. The course focussed on the needs of managers in DIA, the service intelligence organizations, and the J-2 organizations of the Unified and Specified (U&S) Commands. The 19 students who completed the course ranged from GS-13 to GS-15 in grade, and in rank from army major to navy captain. Department of Defense (DOD) organizations represented included Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Army Security Agency, Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Air Force's Office of Special Investigations, and Army Intelligence School. This wide range of experience provided considerable additional value to the students during seminars and discussions outside the class.

2. The course was divided into six sub-courses: (a) The national intelligence structure; (b) The functions of intelligence, which provided details on collection, dissemination, and production of finished intelligence; (c) The management of intelligence, which dealt with the management of collection, dissemination, and production, as well as certain other intelligence activities such as counter-intelligence, and comptroller and automatic data processing; (d) Application of foreign intelligence within commands covered Communism, counter-insurgency, the study of world areas, US policy in individual world areas, and the functions of U&S commands in those areas; (e) Joint and combined intelligence staffs, which included general information on U&S commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combined (such as NATO) commands, and a visit to a U&S command; and (f) The intelligence treatise program, which consisted of the preparation of a course report by each student.



SUBJECT: Report of Attendance at Defense Intelligence  
School's Advanced Intelligence Course

3. This course had two prime values to me: (a) It provided me with a large amount of information on the intelligence activities in the DOD which will be useful in revising our course texts, particularly Volume I which describes the Intelligence Community. This information on DOD is not available anywhere outside of this course. (b) It assisted me in gaining a better perspective of the Intelligence Community. Although my work with CT's provides me an unequalled opportunity to visit other intelligence agencies and to hear talks about their activities, this course for the first time gave me a full realization of the vast range and size of intelligence activities in the DOD. An additional value of this course is that, by broadening my knowledge and contacts outside the CIA it has increased my qualifications for any future rotational assignment that would involve work with the Intelligence Community as a whole.

4. Considering the fact that this was the first running of the course and that many of the presentations given by DOD personnel were apparently the first they had ever given on their area of responsibility, the course was well run and was profitable to all students except one or two who maintained closed minds. The presentations given by the high level DOD personnel were, with a few exceptions, of extremely high quality. Presentations given by middle level personnel frequently consisted of poor reading from over-coordinated manuscripts. There was insufficient attention paid to the basic charters for intelligence activities -- the National Security Act, NSCID's and DCID's, DOD and DIA directives -- as well as with the important planning documents and management tools for the DOD, particularly the Consolidated Intelligence Program. The course emphasis revolved around the management role of J-2 staffs of the U&S commands, although most of the students will probably work in DIA; and visits by the students to U&S commands, plus talks by the J-2's from other U&S commands, suggested that in reality most of their personnel (at least up to and including lieutenant colonel) did relatively little managing but spent a high proportion of their time on the production of basic, current, and indications intelligence (the J-2 of one of the largest unified commands said he spent a great deal of time editing the reports produced by his staff!). However, speakers stressed that J-2 staffs should do an increasing amount of management in the future.

SUBJECT: Report of Attendance at Defense Intelligence School's Advanced Intelligence Course

5. This course was deficient in three major areas of interest to intelligence managers: (a) Because at least half of the class had no more than top secret clearance only a little time was spent on NSA and related activities although this is worthy; in terms of many different measures of comparative intelligence activity and output, of a large amount of time. If clearances had permitted, the amount of time spent on overhead reconnaissance could also have been profitably increased by one-half. For future classes it is planned to obtain necessary clearances to permit these additions. (b) Relatively little time was devoted to CIA. This was a deliberate decision in the original planning, so that the focus would be on DOD intelligence activities; however, by the middle of the course, many students were pointing out that, because of the important role played by CIA in almost every area of DOD intelligence activities, it was necessary to considerably increase this coverage. The course should include one or more packages on CIA on such subjects as: coordination of, and services provided to, clandestine collection and counter-intelligence; covert action; non-clandestine collection; and production of finished intelligence. (c) Although this course is pointed to managers of intelligence activities there was no time devoted to general principles of management. A package on general management could be given by the Army Management School. These three areas of deficiency were pointed out in my course critique.

6. The requirement to produce a course research project was satisfied in my case by (a) Assisting Dr. [redacted] educational specialist in DIS, in developing the course outline for the 13-week Civilian Trainee course which is being given for the first time beginning in June. (b) Meeting with [redacted] and two contractors from [redacted] to plan exercises for the CT course. Some of the exercises are being developed by [redacted] I also worked with CIA and DIA personnel in the development of other exercises. (c) Producing two volumes of readings for the course, entitled Analysts' Files and Research Techniques. These volumes were produced by modifying Annex I, and selected portions of Volumes II and IV of our own text, Intelligence Research Facilities and Techniques. This required

SUBJECT: Report of Attendance at Defense Intelligence  
School's Advanced Intelligence Course

the introduction of considerable new material based on DIA facilities and practices. If time permits, I will assist the DIS in producing a modified version of Volume III, Repositories of Information. The modified version will reduce the attention given to CIA facilities and increase emphasis on DOD facilities.

7. In my opinion this course, particularly if modified as indicated above, should be required of all Agency personnel from Grade GS-13 and up who will be assigned to liaison positions requiring detailed knowledge of DOD intelligence organizations. In addition, this course would be invaluable to other Agency personnel from GS-13 and up who have a need to expand their knowledge of and contacts in DOD intelligence organizations. I would recommend that two or three CIA personnel be sent to each running of this course which will be given twice a year. The following types of individuals would probably benefit most from this course:

(a) DD/P personnel who are to be assigned as CIA liaison officers with DIA or with unified, specified or component commands;

(b) DD/P personnel who coordinate clandestine and CI activities with DOD organizations;

(c) DD/S&T personnel in the Office of Elint and Office of Special Activities involved in collection activities that parallel DOD programs and utilize DOD facilities and services;

(d) DD/I personnel in Collection Guidance Staff, particularly those working in the Human Resources Branch, but also those in the Reconnaissance and Sigint branches, since they are drawing heavily on DOD collection programs;

(e) DD/I personnel in the ORR Military-Economics Area and in OCI Military Division and DD/S&T personnel in OSI and FMSAC whose work is heavily involved with DOD, and who frequently contribute to DOD needs;

(f) OCR and DD/S&T OCS personnel working on the Agency's Project CHIVE, and those working on the CODIB

SUBJECT: Report of Attendance at Defense Intelligence School's Advanced Intelligence Course

staff, who are dealing with the needs of DOD and with problems of inter-face between CIA and DIA systems;

(g) OCR supervisors whose personnel spend a significant proportion of their time fulfilling requests from DOD;

(h) collectors [redacted] who spend a significant proportion of their time meeting the intelligence information needs of DOD;

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(i) CIA members of the Secretariat of USIB committees who need a broader understanding of the DOD viewpoint;

(j) members of the ONE staff who work closely with DOD personnel and who utilize DOD contributions;

(k) CIA personnel assigned to the National Indications Center, which receives major support from all intelligence elements of the DOD;

(l) DD/S support personnel who work closely with DOD elements either in obtaining or giving support;

(m) OTR personnel involved in instruction stressing the entire Intelligence Community, particularly instructors in the Intelligence Orientation Faculty and in the OTR Mid-Career and Senior Officer Courses.

8. The example of this Advanced Intelligence Course suggests the question of whether CIA needs an advanced level course for those personnel whose needs would not be met by, or whose cover would not permit, attendance at the DIS course. Several factors seem to argue against an advanced course: (a) There would seem to be less need for such a course in CIA because managers have generally had a long background in intelligence work, whereas in DOD for some time to come military officers with little intelligence experience will be rotated into intelligence management positions. (b) The Intelligence School's Management Faculty has been providing general management courses which focus on CIA management problems. (c) With the reduction in TO's, there is almost no movement of managers from one directorate to another in CIA, and therefore less need to prepare for possible assignment to other

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School's Advanced Intelligence Course

directorates. (d) Orientation on other portions of the Agency, and updating of information is provided by the Intelligence Orientation, the Intelligence Review, and Mid-Career Courses, and there is nothing to prevent a manager from taking any one of these courses. However, there are a number of values to be derived from a CIA Advanced Intelligence Course. (a) The Intelligence Community, including CIA, has been in a state of rapid change in the last few years; managers are likely to lack information or to possess considerably outdated information about other CIA Directorates and other intelligence agencies which they serve, work with, or from which they receive support. (b) Specialization within one Directorate tends to make a manager more narrow in his viewpoint; an advanced course would broaden his viewpoint. (c) Day-to-day working relationships, particularly if carried on by other than personal contact, are bound to create barriers of mis-understanding between Directorates. An advanced course would provide managers with the opportunity to get personally acquainted with and to discuss mutual, or even individual, problems with managers from other Directorates or managers within the same Directorate who have other functions or specializations.

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
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10 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Training Selection Board, OTR

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FROM:  OCR/GR

SUBJECT: Student Selection Criteria for the  
Advanced Intelligence Course, DIA

1. I have been asked to comment on Agency student selections for the DIA-sponsored Advanced Intelligence Course. This course fits into the general mission of the Defense Intelligence School to conduct courses of instruction related to Department of Defense intelligence functions. This is accomplished with the main focus on how DoD fits into the national planning and policy levels down to the activities and intelligence requirements of the Unified and Specified Commands.

2. In view of the curriculum and activities of this course, I would recommend that students selected have a need to expand their knowledge of, or have frequent contact with, the intelligence components of DoD, or must be aware of the total scope and depth of the intelligence effort as follows:


a. Senior Central Reference personnel who deal with the DoD intelligence components on a daily basis.

b. Agency liaison officers to the Unified and Specified Commands.

c. DD/S&T (OEL and FMSAC) or ORR (Military Economics) research people and others who rely on DoD-collected information.

d. Persons from the Collection Guidance Staff, especially the Human Resources Section, who deal with the Defense Department.

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e. 00/C [ ] representatives who are involved in collecting information for DoD requirements.

f. OCS/CHIVE personnel involved with community-wide application and compatibility of automated systems.

g. Agency members of the USIB Secretariats.



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Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R001000160031-2

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## 5. EVALUATION OF PROGRAM

The Defense Intelligence School did an excellent job in a relatively short time to organize the content and operational requirements necessary for this pilot running of the Advanced Intelligence Course. The course mission as stated in the school charter is "To enhance the preparation of selected senior military officers and key Department of Defense civilian personnel for important command, staff, and policy-making positions in the national, unified staff, and military departmental intelligence structure."

In structuring a course at this level, the faculty was well aware that there would be unavoidable mistakes in the overall plan and the particular lecture sequence. For instance, after living through the course, it was obvious to all that the sub-course on Intelligence Management should come before the sub-course on Intelligence Functions; also there was too much attention placed on counterintelligence and other related aspects of this general field. The biggest handicap, and it was most serious, was the lack of adequate clearances for the entire student body and faculty. This is to be remedied.

The calibre of speakers was generally excellent. This was especially true of the CIA and DoD speakers. A few of the lecturers insisted on speaking from their own personal experience (war stories, etc.) and did not stay with the assigned subject. There were a few instances that once the officer presented his talk he did not have any real depth of knowledge to adequately conduct a question and answer period.

The day to day conduct of this pilot course was definitely influenced by the large number of students that were from training operations, either currently or in the past, and were there to assess the impact and importance of the course.

I would recommend that CIA participation in future classes be limited to no more than three students. The persons selected should be confined to those who have a need to expand their knowledge of the Department of Defense or those who have, or will have, frequent contact with the Department.